The Europeanisation of Islam:
The Role of the Multi-Level Structure of the EU

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ABSTRACT

The emergence of a transnational European-Islamic identity, 'Euro-Islam,' within the member states of the European Union (EU) has recently been explored and asserted by scholars such as Stefano Allievi and Jørgen Nielsen, among others. Various theories have emerged to explain this phenomenon, yet none have considered the EU as a causal factor. The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyse the role of the EU in the emergence of 'Euro-Islam.' I assert that the multi-level structure of the EU is a main explanatory factor in the emergence and transnational nature of 'Euro-Islam.' More specifically, domestic Islamic groups that fail to achieve their objectives at the national level, take their complaints to EU institutions. In the process of doing so, they form transnational alliances, which they use to put additional pressure on the EU, and consequently, on member state governments. The creation of the supranational arena, and of transnational Islamic groups, become catalysts for the advancement of Islamic interests and the creation of a common Islamic identity that transcends borders. In particular, I examine the effect of 'Euro-Islam' on the formation of a common "European identity," Turkish membership and the democratic legitimacy of the Union.

I. INTRODUCTION

In a recent interview with the news magazine Der Spiegel, German interior minister, Otto Schily asserted his long-term goal that, “Muslims in Germany accept a ‘European Islam’ – which respects the values of Enlightenment and stands up for the rights of women” (quoted by Euobserver, 29.11.2004). Earlier this year, Italian interior minister Giuseppe Pisanu similarly spelled out his ambition to promote the growth of a moderate Muslim community in Italy, which he termed “Italian Islam” (ANSA, 14.5.2004). Although Schily and Pisanu are among the first state ministers to comment on and assert ‘European Islam,’ it is not only in Germany and Italy, however, where this phenomenon is encountered. In fact, the emergence of a transnational European-Islamic identity, ‘Euro-Islam,’ within many of the member states of the European Union (EU) has recently been explored and asserted by scholars such as Stefano Allievi (1996), Jørgen Nielsen (1999) and Yasemin Soysal (1997). Various theories have emerged to
explain this phenomenon, yet none have considered the EU as a causal factor. The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyse the role of the multi-level structure of the EU in the emergence of ‘Euro-Islam.’

‘Euro-Islam’ can be defined as a Muslim rejection of European aspirations of their assimilation into western European society, and instead opting for integration. This entails an interactive, two-way process between the Muslims and European society, in which both parties are an active ingredient and, in the end, produce something new (Modood 1997). In this case, a new identity, that of ‘Euro-Islam,’ is created in which aspects of the Western societies in which Muslims are living, are integrated into Islam. As such, ‘Euro-Islam’ is a completely different form of Islam, unique to the member states of the European Union and transnational in nature.¹

Unfortunately, the existing literature has only begun to dissect the relationship between European integration and transnational minority groups, like the European Islamic groups. Part of the problem lies with migration, race and ethnicity researchers who appear unwilling, and perhaps unable, to explore the relationship between new forms of political action and the institutional dynamics of European integration (Favell and Geddes 2000). As such, these researchers rely on the familiar rhetoric of the building of ‘Fortress Europe’ and the inevitable exclusion of ethnic and migrant minorities in a ‘racist’ and ‘fascist’ Europe. As Favell and Geddes claim, such rhetoric “may be an effective strategy for protest by groups who feel marginalized by the EU institutions, but it is a misleading basis for analyzing what is going on at this level” (p. 408).

¹ While the topic of ‘Euro-Islam’ as an emerging identity among Muslims in Europe is quite fascinating, it is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in its many nuances. For this paper, it is important only to understand that such an identity exists and that many causal factors are inherent in its emergence.
In this way, this paper analyses the transnational European Islamic groups at the EU level, asking what role the multi-level structure of the European Union plays in the emergence and transnational nature of ‘Euro-Islam.’ I assert that domestic Islamic groups that fail to achieve their objectives at the national level, take their complaints to EU institutions. In the process of doing so, they form transnational alliances, which they use to put additional pressure on the EU, and consequently, on member state governments. As such, the creation of the supranational arena, and of transnational Islamic groups, become catalysts for the advancement of Islamic interests and the creation of a common Islamic identity that transcends borders.

This paper proceeds as follows. In section II, I review the current literature and discuss the existing theories on which this paper builds. First, I present the two competing trends in ethnicity and migration studies; both the state-centered view, commonly associated with Andrew Geddes and the post-national view, asserted by Riva Kastoryano and Yasemin Soysal. Second, I briefly discuss the theory of multi-level governance, and show how the multiple levels of the EU produce different venues for Islamic groups to seek audiences for their grievances. Section III will show how domestic Islamic groups failed to resolve their issues at the local and national level, and as such, were forced to bring their issues to the EU level. Section IV will discuss the actions and issues that arose when the Islamic groups moved to the EU level, and the importance of the transnational alliances and networks that were created. Finally, section V analyses the implications of an emergent transnational ‘Euro-Islam’ on EU issues: Turkish membership, the European Constitution, the formation of a common ‘European identity,’ and the democratic legitimacy of the EU.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

State-Centered vs. Post-national Theories of Minority Integration in Europe

The main argument of the state-centered perspective has been perfectly summarized by AlSayyad and Castells, “despite the integrative force represented by the EU, citizenship definitions, immigration policies, and recognition of subnational communities are all defined by nation-states” (2002, p.22; emphasis added). In this way, state-centered theorists reject the role of the European level, placing all the importance of any decision-making on policies concerning minority groups, at the national level. As such, it is asserted that mobilized ethnic groups, like Islamic groups, will do well to lobby at the national level, rather than the European level, if they wish to successfully influence the policies that affect them. Favell and Geddes point out, “the organizational behaviour of different ethnic groups is still strongly structured by national political structures and/or the nature of local opportunities; and, despite a great deal of talk about new European opportunities, there is a clear underinvestment in the European level, or worse, the EU remains remote and uninteresting, indeed irrelevant, to these ethnic group’s self-perceived interests” (2000, p. 414). To evidence their argument, they point out that even as issue areas such as free movement, immigration and asylum have been ‘communitarized’ by becoming part of the institutional framework of the EU, it is the member states that have retained control over decision-making in these areas through their use of intergovernmental co-operation (2000, p. 416).

However, those theorists that subscribe to a post-national view assert that the boundaries of the nation-state have been eroded and that a post-national citizenship, based on universal human rights and transnationalism, is an important outlet for migrant
claims (Soysal 1994 and 1997; Koopmans and Statham 2000). Contrary to the state-centered view, the post-nationalists believe the state, while still important, no longer has a monopoly of control on decision-making about policies concerning minorities within their borders. The cause of this lies in the fact that the liberal nation-state is in decline or being seriously challenged in two ways. First, its position as a unit of social organization is being eroded from outside by globalization and a shift of the locus of power from the national to the supranational and transnational levels, and second, the legitimacy, authority and integrative capacities are being weakened from within by the increasing pluralization of modern societies (Koopmans and Statham 2000, p. 191-2). In this way, the EU level takes on an unparalleled importance for the advancement of migrant claims. It is worth quoting Riva Kastoryano at length on this point:

The political reconstruction of Europe creates paradoxes within the nation-states that compose the EU. Its supranational institutions and the transnational organizations it generates lead to a redefinition of the political structure of nation-states, accelerating their process of negotiation both inside and outside their territories. For immigrant populations, these increasingly appear as a crucial structure for negotiating the claimed and represented identity and interest ultimately with the state. The state constitutes the only concrete protective framework for rights. Shaping transnational networks becomes a way to influence states from the outside while keeping the ‘idea of a nation’ for mobilization. All these relations between Europe, the nation-states, and the foreign immigrants with a European identity lead to a redefinition of the concepts of universality, particularity, nationality, and citizenship – concepts that shape a European identity and its effect of multiple negotiations, which show even more in transnationality (2002, p. 165).

As such, these transnational networks, of which Islamic groups are a part, rely on the fact that they are able to utilize the European level in unique and important ways in order to influence their national governments’ policies towards their interests. A brief explanation of how the multi-level structure of the EU encourages such action follows.
The multi-level structure of the EU includes the supranational level made up of the common EU institutions, the national level, which includes the member state governments, and the sub-national level, which is made up of local units. In creating such a political space, the ‘founding fathers’ provided a two-fold advantage to interest groups in need of an audience for their grievances. First, Wayne Sandholtz points to the way EU institutions can affect political behavior and outcomes by creating options for domestic actors by giving them their choice of allies (1996). In this way, the supranational institutions can become potential coalition partners with domestic societal groups against their non-responsive local or national governments. Second, the creation of the supranational level made possible the emergence of multiple political arenas, a ‘Brussels complex,’ that organizes ongoing, open-ended negotiation around a large number of common issues (Stone Sweet et al. 2001, p. 1).

Therefore, with the creation of the EU level, interest groups, like the Islamic groups, have both a new ally and a new arena in which to agitate for a successful conclusion to their grievances. No longer must they rely only on their uninterested and non-responsive state governments in order to gain a satisfactory response to their issues.

III. THE FAILURE OF ISLAMIC GROUPS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

According to Patrick Ireland, “the ethnicity theory predicts that immigrants of the same background in different host societies will adopt roughly similar forms of participation, a result even more likely in light of the similar socioeconomic conditions and levels of anti-immigrant sentiment that endured across Western Europe” (2000, p.
In this way, two types of Muslim organizations have developed within the member states of the EU: those dealing with *tactical necessity* and others dealing with *identity politics*. The former seeks to achieve equality of opportunity for their members, fighting against racism and discrimination and helping their members to obtain jobs, houses and education. The latter is concerned with the maintenance of identity and pursuit of homeland political concerns; they see maintenance of a separate identity as essential in order to negotiate from a position of strength within their host society, using already available forms of organization and consciousness as a resource (Rex 1994, p. 9). The Islamic groups that this paper is concerned with are of the first type, tactical necessity, and they are identified as The Islamic Foundation (United Kingdom), The Association of German Muslims, and The Federation Nationale des Musulmans de France (FNMF).²

Pursuing similar socio-economic goals at the national level, these domestic Islamic groups all find their success blocked for three reasons. First, Muslims face intense socio-economic and religious marginalization within Europe, second, the parameters in which they engage the state are defined by the state, and finally, what power the Islamic groups do have is severely limited within the state. It is these factors that lead to failure for Islamic interest groups at the national level, and force them to look to the EU level institutions in order to find another arena in which to pursue a successful conclusion to their claims.

² This list is in no way exhaustive, nor do I claim that these particular organizations represent all of the Muslims in their respective member states. They are simply examples of the *tactical necessity* organizations with which my research is concerned. It is interesting to note that many of these groups were founded in response to *identity politics* organizations, which many European Muslims felt were controlled by and too concerned with homeland politics.
The Marginalization of Muslims in Europe

Like other minority groups living in European states, much of the Muslim population finds themselves living in poverty and without an entitlement to rights of any kind. Manifesting itself most severely in the 1980s, this situation has been exacerbated since 11 September as many Muslims have become the target of discrimination and racist violence. This new form of ‘Islamophobia’ that strikes modern Europeans has forced public opinion against Muslims, and in this way, has marginalized their causes in the eyes of political elites. Since most Muslims are refused voting rights, it is almost impossible for them to affect change in their societies without the support of public opinion.

A recent and important cause célèbre which recently shook French society, was that of the ‘scarf affair.’ While encompassing many complex elements, the most crucial issue that emerged was Islam and its incompatibility with the secular principles of France. Politicians and some intellectuals took it upon themselves to remind society of the basic principles of the Republic, principles designated the ‘core of national identity,’ and to remind Muslims of the ‘proper way of life’ in a country that has made laïcité its state religion (Kastoryano 1999, p.197). In this way, Islam and the Muslims who practiced it were presented as outsiders in French society with no chance of assimilation or integration because of their direct incompatibility with the secular state. This put them at odds with the citizens of French society, as well as with the state itself.

Being poor, living in ghettos, unable to vote and branded ‘incompatible’ with the French state, Muslims, represented by organizations like the FNMF, had very little power to affect the decision on the head scarves. Nor were they able to focus the debate on the

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3 The 1980s saw the culmination of many years of Muslim social disenfranchisement manifest itself in both the ‘Rushdie’ and ‘Bradford’ affairs.
‘real’ issues surrounding their plight in French society: discrimination in housing, access to the labor market, religious needs, and their all-around socio-economic marginalization within society.

State Defined Parameters for Interaction

Any interest group who wishes to engage or interact within the national domestic arena is at the mercy of the state, as this is where the parameters for interaction are defined. This poses a major problem for ethnic minority representatives, like Islamic groups, who find it very difficult to get their agenda on the table or to be seriously and effectively heard during meetings (Drury 1994, p. 21). Much of the reason for the state’s lack of attention to Islamic groups has to do with the socio-economic marginalization of these groups as discussed above. However, being marginalized by society is one thing, while being prevented from presenting your grievances to the national government because of institutionalized exclusion is another, more egregious problem.

Both Germany and France have institutionalized exclusion of Islamic groups, but it occurs in different ways. In Germany, the law distinguishes between recognized and non-recognized religious communities. The Islamic organizations, of which there are many in Germany, have not managed to receive recognition, not even in Berlin where the Association of German Muslims has been trying since 1980 (Pedersen 1999, p. 32). In France, Muslim groups are also excluded, but it is through the state’s continued refusal to acknowledge any religious associations. In this way, both Germany and France, through the way in which they define the parameters of who is able to interact with the state and
get their agenda onto the table, exclude Islamic groups from a successful solution to their issues.

_Lack of Power as an Actor in the National Arena_

Being marginalized and being excluded by the state’s defined parameters of interaction, puts the Islamic groups under the umbrella of ‘lack of power’ within the national arena. However, the situation is even more compounded than the first two factors show. Unlike political parties that draw their strength from their capacity to mobilize voters in elections, minority interest groups, like the Islamic organizations, face the problems of being minorities within a democratic society. As John Rex explains, “they (minorities) may from time to time be able to mobilize extra-parliamentary sanctions through industrial actions or street riots, and they may bargain with the existing parties to represent their interests, but the idea of a minority party based upon a particular ethnic or religious community has rarely had any significant success” (1994, p. 8). As such, the Islamic groups, powerless to mobilize voters, have no leverage over the state; and so, Muslim issues fail to garner the attention of the national political elites.

This frustration is evidenced by an interview Riva Kastoryano had with an association leader in Marseilles who claimed, “it was harder to negotiate the plan with the Departments or the District than with the European Community, which accepted it at the outset, while we couldn’t get a meeting with the lowest official of the District” (2002, p. 171). Thus, this offhand comment summarizes succinctly the hardship encountered by Islamic groups at the national level, and the reasons why they organize and take their issues to the EU institutions.
Failure at the National Level = A Trip to Brussels

Because of failure at the national level to have their grievances satisfactorily addressed, Islamic groups have recently begun to utilize the supranational level of the EU. Because of the factors discussed above: intense socio-economic and religious marginalization within Europe, the state defined parameters of interaction, and a lack of power in the national arena, Islamic groups have grown weary and frustrated with the state of their affairs within European society. Recognizing the increased interdependence among the multi-level structure of the EU in which every demand at the national level implies a simultaneous pressure at the European level and a similar situation in which every claim at the European level affects the national decisions of each member state (Kastoryano 2002, p. 171), Islamic interest groups have become Brussels bound.

IV. ISLAMIC INTEREST GROUPS GO TO BRUSSELS

The EU represents a new political space for the claims of citizens and legal residents alike. In fact, according to Riva Kastoryano, “efforts to construct a political Europe have stimulated immigrants in some countries to extend their networks to other states and to work out transnational solidarities based on nationality, religion, or ethnicity” (1999, p. 198). Furthermore, for descendants of immigrants, a transnational organization has become a way to bypass national policies and negotiate a recognition beyond the limits set by national models in the states where they reside (Kastoryano 2003, p. 164). This explanation fits the situation with Islamic interest groups at the European level, as they are joined by a common religion as well as a common interest in
pressuring their states to address their particular issues. It is in forming these transnational alliances at the EU level in order to provide a more unified front for lobbying, that a transnational version of Islam, ‘Euro-Islam,’ emerges. This occurs because of three important factors: first, through the EU institutions themselves, second, through the interaction between Europe and the Islamic organizations, and finally, because of the ‘dynamic umma’ that has emerged.

EU Institutions and the Forging of Transnational Islamic Alliances

The importance of EU institutions in the creation and emergence of transnational Islamic networks has received scant attention in the literature. However, it has been noted that since 1986, the European Parliament (EP) has made funds available to so-called immigrant associations, like the Islamic groups, to coordinate their activities on the EU level (Kastoryano 2002, p. 172). By funding transnational alliances, the EP has enabled and encouraged the emergence of Islamic umbrella groups at the EU level in which Muslim associations from various member states come together and lobby the EU institutions. This umbrella organization will be discussed in further detail below.

Furthermore, the EU institutions have a hand in helping the Islamic activists develop political strategies and mobilization beyond the member states (Kastoryano 2002, p. 171). Whether it is courting support for its ‘common European identity’ (Wiener 1997) or looking for ways to add to their areas of competence, EU institutions have always been active in any issue area in which they can benefit. This is most definitely true in the area of migrant and minority rights, an area in which the member states still
have a firm hold on decision and policy-making, and in which EU institutions would like to get a foothold.

In this way, both transnational Islamic groups and EU institutions benefit from their relationship. However, it is the emergence of transnational Islamic alliances enabled by the funding and strategic advice of EU institutions, like the EP, that are of concern in this paper. It is through these alliances that national Islamic groups are joined and a common ‘Euro-Islamic’ identity is forged. This link will become more clear as this section proceeds.

The Interaction Between Europe and the Islamic Organizations

The formal networks among the Muslim communities in Europe play a significant role that is not only a function of the organized structure of the immigrant generation, but also of the institutional framework of the European environment (Nielsen 2003, p. 32). It is, in fact, this interaction between the two (alluded to above) that has provided the most success for transnational Islamic alliances. Islamic groups have learned that to achieve an impact, both broadly and within the EU, “in terms of public status and of delivering services expected by the Islamic community, the political-legal environment requires structural formats which can be linked together and can ‘speak’ to each other within a mutually comprehensible discourse” (ibid). Furthermore, it is the host society which sets the parameters for the interaction, and so the Islamic groups have had to find ways in which it can organize itself at the EU level in keeping within these parameters, yet successfully elucidating their demands, as well. It is in these kinds of interactions that both transnational Islamic alliances and ‘Euro-Islam’ emerges.
First, the transnational alliances must form so that Islamic groups can both organize themselves so that they meet with the structural format of EU lobby groups (a conglomerate of similar-minded groups from all the interested member states) and second, so that it can effectively lobby for a successful response to its demands. By interacting in a two-way process with the EU, the transnational Islamic lobby groups also interact with each other and assert common interests and an identity that has been influenced by their time spent in the European environment. The product is a common European Islamic identity.

To assert the power of this interactive relationship between Europe and domestic Islamic groups, one can look at the transnational Islamic lobby groups that emerge. In Europe, there are Muslims from very different backgrounds and with very different orientations that have established forms of interaction that would have been difficult to imagine in the Muslim world itself (Nielsen 2003, p. 41). The lobby group *Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe* (FIOE) is one such example and will be discussed in the following section. It is only through their interactions in Europe that these diverse actors came together in a common arena for a common cause and created a common identity.

*The Dynamic Umma in the European Space*

Finally, the dynamic umma was integral in the emergence of transnational alliances and the ensuing Euro-Islamic identity among European Muslims. This dynamic umma has been created because of the constant movement of European Muslims within the space of the EU and which, because of this movement, come in contact with one another, and, on the other hand, also bring the countries and communities they come into
contact with into relationships with one another (Allievi 2003, p. 8-9). It is in this way that transnational alliances are a self-fueling process, a process that, once it has been launched, ‘produces itself’ through its own dynamics (ibid).

As briefly mentioned in the above sections, the FIOE is an important example of an Islamic transnational alliance that was created at the EU level with the sole purpose of representing the interests of Muslims living throughout the member states of the EU. It actively interacts with other institutions and structures of the wider European society and consistently brings both Muslims and their member states together in a common EU level forum on a platform of Muslim rights within European societies.

Furthermore, there is a transnational link between the Islamic Foundation located in the UK and the Association of German Muslims that was founded because of EU level interaction between the two groups. These groups engage in a regular interchange both of publications and of the occasional personnel and projects, usually in conferences (Nielsen 2003, p. 38).

It is in this way, at the EU level, that transnational Islamic networks are formed, having failed to engage their member states in a successful solution to their grievances as a single actor, they attempt to find satisfaction by joining forces. Through their encouragement and support by EU institutions, the two-way relationship between the European space and the Islamic organizations, and the dynamic umma, the interactions that Muslims from all over Europe engage in with each other and with Europe form both the alliances and the ‘Euro-Islamic’ identity.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF EURO-ISLAM FOR SELECTED EUROPEAN ISSUES & HYPOTHESES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The emergence of a common European-Islamic identity that is transnational in nature and addresses the social predicaments and daily experiences of life in Europe has some implications for important issues that are affecting the EU today. Among these issues are Turkish membership, the formation of a common ‘European identity’ and the democratic legitimacy of the Union. Each issue will be addressed in turn and hypotheses for further research on that issue will be presented.

Turkish Membership

As the specter of Turkish membership within the EU looms in the distance, there has been much discussion over Europe’s acceptance of a large Muslim state into the folds of ‘Christian’ Europe. This will pose many challenges to Europeans who have still not come to terms with large, permanent, indigenous Muslim populations in most European states, the fact that Muslims will not assimilate in the same way as previous migrants, and that Islam in now a European religion (AlSayyad and Castells 2002, p. 10).

However, it is my belief that as ‘Euro-Islam’ becomes more familiar to Europeans they will no longer fear the large Muslim population that comes along with Turkish membership. Since ‘Euro-Islam’ incorporates many European sensibilities and values that are common and understood by Europeans, their fear of Islam as a ‘fundamentalist religion’ will subside. They will see ‘Euro-Islam’ as a moderate religion and how the Muslim populations within the member states adapted it successfully. As such, the hypothesis that I will test in future research is as follows:
**H1:** As Europeans become familiar with and understand the aspects of ‘Euro-Islam,’ their opinion of the membership of Turkey, a predominantly Muslim state, will become more positive.

Such a hypothesis could easily be tested by survey data and the results of the findings could be used to help influence the mandatory referendum in some states on Turkish membership.

**A Common European Identity**

Promoting a common European identity has been a project of the EU institutions since very early in their existence. It is believed that the EU would be more legitimate if it could boast ‘European citizens,’ and as such, it has promoted a feeling of comraderie amongst its inhabitants for many years now in the hopes that one day a common identity will emerge. As of yet, it has not happened, but in the near future it may, and so it is important to address the implications that a transnational common identity among Muslims in Europe, ‘Euro-Islam,’ will have on a European identity.

I believe that as ‘Euro-Islam’ grows in popularity and becomes more apparent within European society, it will be harder for Europeans to ignore it. As such, they will be forced to come to terms with it and the people within their societies that adhere to it. This leads to the following hypothesis:

**H2:** As ‘Euro-Islam’ becomes more apparent within European society, the notion of a ‘common European identity’ will become more difficult to define and promote to the inhabitants of the European Union.

The paradox within this hypothesis is interesting: as a common identity among Muslims living in Europe becomes more coherent, a common identity among Europeans becomes more difficult to conceptualize.
The Democratic Deficit

Much ink has been spilled arguing for or against the controversial democratic deficit within the EU. In terms of the scope of this paper, it has been argued that the EU promotes major initiatives in ethnic mobilization in order to counter the democratic deficit (Rex 1994, p. 11). It is hoped that by encouraging the participation of every facet of society, democracy will be served in the way of every societal group having their voices heard on EU policy areas that are important to them.

In this way, the interests of ‘Euro-Islam’ and the state of democracy in the EU will be better served as Muslims become a more coherent and organized lobby group:

H3: As ‘Euro-Islam’ emerges as a coherent and representative identity for European Muslims, it will decrease the democratic deficit.

Thus, as ‘Euro-Islam’ becomes more organized and representative of European Muslims, it will allow those without a voice in the national arena to affect policy at the EU level.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

As Muslim groups find themselves less satisfied with the state of their affairs within the member states of the EU, they increasingly have turned to the supranational level and EU institutions, in order to attempt to acquire the rights that others living within Europe enjoy. In the process of lobbying the EU institutions, transnational alliances are created among groups who are agitating for similar rights within their respective states. The process of creating these transnational alliances includes the interaction between Muslim groups from different member states, as well as their interaction with the EU. As this process unfolds, a transnational identity is formed, ‘Euro-Islam.’ This common
identity takes aspects of European values and mixes them with the tenets of Islam, creating a moderate form of Islam unique to European Muslims.

The importance of the emergence of a common transnational identity for Muslims living in Europe has many implications for current European issues. I have set out some hypotheses that may be used in future research in order to understand the vast and complex nature of ‘Euro-Islam’ and the importance of the multi-level structure of the EU in bringing it about.
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